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Introduction
1 According to an influential definition of “securitisation” by the Copenhagen school, we can
talk of  securitisation when the security imperative is  used in political  discourse and
decision-making to justify an expansion of state powers, often at the expense of human
rights.1 “Security” itself is a contested notion, originally meant to designate the security of
the state in an international relations perspective. It has been gradually broadened in
scope to  encompass  other  dimensions.  “Societal  security”  designates  the  security  of  a
society, understood as physical security against threats of violent attacks, but also as
social cohesion and collective well-being.2 Human Security is generally meant to highlight
the potential conflict between state or societal security and the well-being of individuals,
in the context of mounting concerns over the extensive use of security by a variety of
political  actors  as  a  justification  for  a  growing  list  of  policies  with  often  dubious
implications.3
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2 The security-integration nexus is apparent in the ways in which the ability of the state to
control migration flows – border control, asylum restrictions, deportation orders, criteria
for citizenship acquisition – are conceptualised and justified with reference to both state
and societal security. While issues related to immigration already prompted concerns in
the last decades of the 20th century, after 9/11 these concerns intensified and turned into
fears.4 This development is  the prolongation of a long-term shift  from comparatively
liberal immigration regimes in the post-war decades to the construction of immigration
as a problem and a risk, as suggested by Christopher Rudolph.5 
3 Dominant  approaches  to  migrant  “integration”  –  understood  as  state  strategies  to
facilitate the settlement of migrants and their descendants in their host societies – have
undergone a parallel trajectory, from a differentialist, multiculturalist phase in the 1960s,
1970s and 1980s, to a “neo-assimilationist” phase since the late 1990s. In this phase of “
backlash”  against  multiculturalism  or  “retreat”  from  it,  European  political  discourses
suggest that too much has been done to allow ethnic minorities to express their cultural
singularities, and not enough to ask them to adjust to the values of their host society, as
underlined  by  Vertovec  and  Wessendorf  as  well  as  by  Joppke.6 Their  incapacity  or
unwillingness to abide by shared national values, usually defined with reference to the
rule of law, democracy, tolerance, human rights, is now presented as a threat to social
cohesion and as the source of an identity malaise in Western national communities. This
often  results  in  the  “illiberal”  tightening  of  criteria  for  inclusion  in  the  national
community, for example through restrictive reforms of settlement and naturalisation.7 
4 The parallel between the securitisation of migration and border control, on the one hand,
and migrant integration, on the other, can be captured by analogy with the notion of a “
continuum of threats”, an expression coined by Didier Bigo to designate the expansion of
the remit of police cooperation in Europe to terrorism, drugs, organised crime, mafias,
human trafficking, and asylum seekers, presented as closely related problems.8 It draws
attention to the social and political construction of “threats”, the product of professional
strategies of police organisations that have had an interest in seizing new issues and
incorporating them in their policy remit. So, while there is no denying the reality of
threats like terrorism or various types of criminality, the ways in which they are defined,
analysed, and which types of solutions are proposed and at what level of policy-making
these solutions should be implemented, take different shapes according to the interests of
a  variety  of  actors.  They  may  be  international  organisations,  governments,  political
parties,  as  well  as  experts,  academics,  consultative  panels  or  representatives  of
professional organisations.
5 In the policy areas touching on “integration” – State-church relations, local community
partnerships,  naturalisation,  citizenship  –  the  shift  to  increasingly  securitised
understandings  of  ethnic  diversity  has  been  driven  by  the  desire  to  maintain  the
legitimacy  of  governments  in  the  context  of  economic  globalisation,  continuing
migration flows, and welfare cuts. In the UK, this is vividly illustrated for example by the
white paper Secure Borders,  Safe  Haven (2002),  which spelled out the rationale for the
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act adopted the same year. The white paper sought
explicitly  to balance the inevitability  of  future migration to the UK (and in fact  the
deliberate strategy of opening UK borders to specific types of migrations, as underlined
by Somerville9 and Lassalle10), with the anti-immigration sentiments of large sections of
the press and of the Conservative party. Hence the bill contained the proposal, which was
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groundbreaking at the time in the UK, of a citizenship ceremony including an oath of
allegiance for naturalisation applicants.11
6 The shift is also justified and theorised by a variety of sub-political actors, such as civil
servants,  academics  and experts,  who can be viewed as  intermediary actors  (neither
frontline deliverers of public services nor political actors) or as agents of “institutional
reflexivity”.12 They contribute powerfully to shaping dominant discourse and approaches,
both reflecting and reinforcing government strategies. This is particularly the case in the
United Kingdom where the last decade has seen a flurry of new concepts, vocabulary and
approaches launched into the public debates by ministerial  reports.  It  is  this type of
discourse that this paper analyses,  focusing on two policy areas:  (a) the discourse on
social cohesion and community, which has become the official guideline for a wide range
of policy areas touching on immigrant integration since 2001,  (b) and the preventive
dimension of the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, the PREVENT programme. 
7 In both domains,  the shift  to securitisation was prompted or accelerated after tragic
events with a strong impact on the news cycle and triggered changes in major policy
areas. 
8 The first was the spate of urban rioting of the spring and summer of 2001, just before
9/11,  in the north of England, involving predominantly young males of “South Asian”
origin (Pakistanis, largely). After these events “multiculturalism” and “multicultural policies
” were denounced, and Asian minorities accused of “self-segregating” and of not doing
enough to foster the acceptance of “shared” British values within their communities. A
new official discourse appeared, centred on “community cohesion”, integration and shared
values. The second is the London bombings of 2005, which heralded the rise of PREVENT
as the main arena for interaction between local authorities and Muslim communities on
the basis of common efforts to counter extremist discourse in local Muslims communities.
Paradoxically, the critical review that we undertake below reveals an unintended effect of
these  policies,  which  is  the  ethnicisation  of  the  populations  targeted.  While  these
approaches have turned away from the attempts to give recognition to ethnic diversity,
and  to  redress  inequalities  related  to  cultural  difference  and discrimination,  which
justified  the  multiculturalist  dimension  of  previous  policies,  they  still  result  in  the
construction of culture, ethnicity or religion as a problem and a “threat”. However some
aspects of the Coalition’s intention to revise the PREVENT strategy seemed to correspond
to a partial  desecuritisation of Muslim communities,  largely,  it  seems,  in response to
widespread criticisms of the programme among practitioners, community leaders and
academics. This seems to suggest that securitisation is not ineluctable because it can be at
least to some extent countered through participation in public debates by the targeted
communities and their allies. 
 
Securitised communities: “citizenship”, “shared
values” and “community”
9 Both  the  Labour  governments  of  the  1997-2010  period  and  the  Liberal  Democrat-
Conservative coalition that replaced them sought to move away from the multiculturalist
approach  by  emphasising  citizenship,  organised  around  shared  values  and  social
cohesion.  Although the specific  language and some of  the policies  differ,  the central
tenets of the integration policies for both regimes are predicated on the same ideological
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premises. At the core lies the idea of community. This was evident when the term was
used by Tony Blair and his allies to coin new concepts such as “community cohesion”. The
assumption of the communautarian vision of society is also discernible in the various pro-
religion  strands  of  the  Big  Society  and localism,  which  both  inspired  the  coalition’s
approach. The contradictory impulses of community – the inclusion of individuals into a
group, and the simultaneous exclusion of others through the very process of delineating
the contours of the group – therefore lie at the heart of much British policy-making in
fields pertaining to immigrant integration. This can be traced back to the common roots
of  both  New Labour  and coalition  approaches:  New Right  ideas  and the  “New Public
Management”. Their influence has been a constant in British politics since the 1970s and
has  been  closely  correlated  to  the  transition  to  a  managerial  state.13 The  idea  of
reimagining local government as a coordinator and participant in partnerships with local
communities originated in New Right thinking about “a minimalist role for local government
which would create the conditions for others to engage in service provision”.14 As they either re-
organise or directly dismantle the welfare state, governments are compelled to provide
new narratives to paint a coherent picture of  early 21st century society at  a time of
challenge  for  one  of  its  traditional  backbones,  state  redistribution.  Discourses  on
community and cohesion justify the transition of state-society relations from a model of
hierarchical and direct linkage between policies and citizens to a model of triangular
relation between policies, individuals, and “communities”, which are both recipients of
and participants in the implementation of the policies in the context of “partnerships”
between government organisations and “the third sector” or “civil society”. Some authors
have  written about  government  through communities  as  a  technology of  citizenship
which, applied to community empowerment programmes, encourages active citizenship
in the provision of social services in order to reduce the public’s dependence on services
once these are rolled back.15 
10 Here we retrace the history of the various policies in which the logic of community has
been evident since 1997 in policy areas related to immigrant integration, as shown in the
writings  of  Anthony  Giddens  who  argued  in  1998  that  though  “entirely  laudable”
multiculturalist  policies and their aim (“to counter the exploitation of  oppressed groups”)
could not be fruitful without “the support of the broad national community” and had to “
stretch beyond the claims and grievances of any specific group”.16 Likewise, the identification of
“institutional  racism”  following  the  MacPherson  inquiry  (1999)  has  sometimes  been
interpreted  as  having  signalled  the  end  of  “identity  politics”17 that  is,  favouring  the
recognition of ethnic minority cultures over binding national community ties, at a time
when Lord Parekh still positively defined Britain as “a community of communities”.18 
11 From 2001 onward, new forms of unrest in inner-city areas in the North and the Midlands
and Islamist terrorism (across the Atlantic first, then in Spain and the UK) led to the
sudden and dramatic rhetorical discarding of multiculturalism and, simultaneously, to
the framing of “cohesion” policies (although arguably such changes had been underlying
since 1997,  or indeed since the Major years). The riots (in Bradford or Oldham, e.g.)
therefore  shook  the  multicultural  settlement  to  its  very  roots,  just  like  the  ensuing
reports, both local19 and national20 and the frontal criticisms expressed for the first time
by Labour figureheads (e.g. David Blunkett, Jack Straw). In Bradford, the Ouseley report
emphasised residential  and school  segregation and an overall  sense  of  “separateness”
resulting both from the flight of middle class people (whites, Hindus and Sikhs) out of
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certain areas and from a neat tendency towards self-segregation amongst certain Muslim
communities. 
12 Although the “community cohesion” concept was to be presented for the first time in the
Cantle report five months later, certain values praised by the Ouseley commission were
already consistent with it, as shown in the following passage: “What is now desperately
needed is a powerful unifying vision […] social harmony, rejection of racial hatred, civic pride, a
single common identity.”21 The Cantle review team, commissioned by the Home Office after
the disturbances of summer 2001, gave no ready made definition of community cohesion,
although what it had meant in Canada since 1996 under the name of “social cohesion” was
made clear.22 The report insisted on “common values and a civic culture”, “common aims and
objectives”, “common moral principles and codes of behaviour”, “inter-group co-operation” etc.
Although  community  cohesion  could  apply  to  economic  considerations  (e.g.  “Social
solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities”), it especially meant encouraging
commonality, shared values and interaction, which, it was implied, had been overlooked
by “multi-cultural” (sic) policies.
13 Among the report’s seventy recommendations, citizenship occupied a central position. In
particular, the idea of citizenship ceremonies, inspired by those in existence in Australia
or Canada under the same name, came to the fore. Another key recommendation was
citizenship education, which was introduced in the national curriculum as early as 2002
so as “to stress integration rather than separation”, as underlined by Tony Blair in December
2006. Community cohesion, though loosely-defined, quickly became a buzz word. That
sudden promotion, which perplexed many Britons, should be contrasted with the timid or
indeed, non-existent promotion of “multiculturalism” in its prescriptive acceptation in the
1980s and 1990s, although it had become Britain’s de facto policy since the inner-city riots
of the early and mid-1980s. The rejection of multiculturalism was reinvigorated by the
materialisation  of  the  terrorist  threat  in  Britain  (“7/7”  attacks  in  London)  and  was
articulated  by  the  Conservative  opposition  as  well  as  by  the  Labour  majority.  More
surprising  still,  were  the  criticisms  formulated  by  members  of  the  ethnic  minority
intelligentsia.23 
14 With the change of government in 2010, and the replacement of Gordon Brown’s Labour
government by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition led by David Cameron and
Nick Clegg, the concept of “community cohesion” lost currency and some changes were
introduced. Significantly, it was replaced by “Integration and Race Equality”, when Liberal-
Democrat Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Andrew Stunnel left the government in
2012. But the central tenets of shared values and citizenship were not challenged, and
actually  were  reinforced,  to  such  an  extent  that  the  accusations  of  unreconstructed
assimilationism by stealth have become increasingly convincing. Some aspects of the new
policies proposed, at least at the level of stated intentions, have also propelled the Church
of  England  to  the  centre-stage  of  local  partnerships  with  community  organisations,
reinventing an older pattern of religious management of British inter-racial  relations
(one example being the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, headed by the
Archbishop  of  Canterbury  in  the  mid-1960s).  The  trend  towards  deepening  neo-
assimilationism has also been evident in the moves by Theresa May, the Conservative
Home Secretary of the coalition and of the current Conservative government, to harden
the requirements for the acquisition of citizenship, building on or indeed extending David
Blunkett’s 2002 initiative. The “Life in the UK” test, which, after much debating in the early
years  of  the  millennium,  had  remained  pointedly  devoid  of  any  material  on  British
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culture and history,  now contains  a  whole  section on key aspects  of  British history.
Generally, the term integration has been given an increased prominence. In 2012, the
coalition published a document entitled Creating the Conditions for Integration, which has
pushed further the move away from multiculturalism that had been started by Labour, at
least  at  the  level  of  discourse.24 The  overall  objective  was  to  enhance  five  factors
contributing  to  integration:  tackling  extremism  and  intolerance;  social  mobility;
participation; responsibility and “common ground”. In its preamble, the document denied
any social or racial dimension to the 2011 riots, blaming instead “criminality” and “lack of
social responsibility”. It criticised past government interventionism along racial or faith
lines, adding that other factors such as location or socio-economic status also shape local
societies. It criticised anti-discrimination policy, which so far had remained unchallenged
by the critics of multiculturalism:
In  the past,  integration challenges have been met in  part  with legal  rights  and
obligations around equalities, discrimination and hate crime. This has not solved
the problem and,  where it  has encouraged a focus on single issues and specific
groups, may in some cases have exacerbated it.25 
15 It then went on: “Today, integration requires changes to society, not to the law”, reinforcing a
trend  already  perceptible  under  New  Labour.  Accordingly,  the  governmental  action
programme that is proposed in the rest of the document is strikingly unambitious and
consists of a ramshackle list of minor projects to fund youth programmes. It also cites the
Localism Act of 2011 as a means of empowering local communities. 
16 Elements of continuity with New Labour can also be found in this idea of “localism” and in
the  Big  Society  agenda  that  inspired  Cameron’s  approach  to  local  government  and
community partnerships in the first years of his government. The Big Society – meaning
the encouragement of civic engagement by all citizens in the delivery of public services
and community activities – is often derided for its conceptual shallowness, but it does
refer to some of the most fundamental tenets of British policy-making in the last twenty
years. First, it is obvious that it serves to justify the disengagement of the state from local
public services and the drastic reduction of the remit of local government action. In this
respect,  it  is  distinct  from  New  Labour,  which  had  deeply  reconceptualised  and
reorganised the modalities  of  state  interventionism,  including by introducing Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs), but had not sought to shrink its perimeter. However, the
proposal to replace public services with the voluntary work of civic-minded residents
builds on the ever-present notion of community, which as shown above was already a
central  plank  of  New Labour’s  thinking.  In  his  landmark  speech  on  the  Big  Society
delivered at Milton Keynes on 23 May 2011, Cameron declared: 
Tradition, community, family, faith, the space between the market and the state –
this is the ground where our philosophy is planted. The things I’ve spoken about
today – modernising public services, rebuilding responsibility, strengthening family
and community, all this represents a massive cultural change.26
17 In another speech delivered later the same year, on the occasion of the 400th anniversary
of the King James Bible, he asserted the willingness of the coalition to place Christianism
back at the heart of government policy, declaring that “the values we draw from the Bible go
to the heart of what it means to belong in this country”27. In concrete terms, this translated for
instance into the “Near Neighbours” programme which made local Anglican parishes key
actors  in  the  funding  of  local  partnerships  with  community  organisations,  including
ethnic  minority  ones.  Typically  this  meant  that  local  groups  and  projects,  whether
Christian, secular, or of other faiths, were now required to obtain the counter-signature
Community and Citizenship in the Age of Security: British Policy Discourse on...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXI-1 | 2016
6
of the local vicar to benefit from this programme.28 Paradoxically enough, this has not
prevented  leading  Church  of  England  figures  from  accusing  the  UK  government  of
fostering “aggressive secularism” over certain issues, such as same sex marriage.29 
18 This  policy  displays  elements  of  continuity  with  Labour,  which,  despite  Alastair
Campbell’s famous assertion (“We don’t do God”), had displayed a clear pro-religion bias in
many aspects of its integration policies. In the area of local community partnerships, New
Labour had already emphasised the role of the Church after the 2005 London bombings.
The novelty after 2010 was that the coalition promoted the role of the Church of England
only, thus dispensing with the pluralism that was evident in New Labour’s attitude to
religion:  dialogue  with  a  broad  array  of  Muslim  organisations,  legislation  against
incitement  to  religious  hatred  (a  long-standing  claim  of  Muslim  organisations),  or
extension  of  public  funding  to  minority  schools  in  1998.  The  relationship  between
community and citizenship is ambiguous. On one level, communities are presented as
inclusive. They respond to a security imperative: “Community offers people what neither
society nor the state can offer, namely a sense of belonging in an insecure world”.30 Thus, the
community is both an antidote to the destabilising forces of the globalised economy that
threaten the social compact and an ideal goal of policies. It refers to an elusive golden
age, which is usually the first half of the twentieth century, when the working class was
supposed to be organised harmoniously around trade unions and networks of solidarity
at the local level.31 As a remedy to destabilisation, communities are meant to replace the
bureaucratic welfare state by new patterns of neighbourhood organisations,  based on
reconstructed understandings of British values –however defined. 
19 The convergence with governmental approaches to international migration is clear. The
globalising forces that shape today’s world have been relocated beyond national borders,
which threatens the state’s legitimacy and seems to make social decay uncontrollable,
threatening traditional forms of social cohesion. In Britain, this has been explicitly put
forward as the backbone of the ideological refoundation of the Labour party by Lord
Glassman as part of the Blue Labour agenda supported by Ed Milliband in 2010-2011. Blue
Labour was meant to encapsulate both a nostalgia for the golden age of the working class
and an anti-immigration stance in the name of the stability of communities. Yet at the
same time, the notion of community is often used to designate “troubled” populations.32
The reasons why traditional forms of organisation longed after by the nostalgics of trade
unions, Parish Churches and working-class political parties is that they have given way to
the  individualisation  of  society,  which  in  turn  brings  personalised  anxiety  and
scapegoating.33 Hence, the relation between the onslaught against the welfare state and
the rise of backlash against women, racial and sexual minorities, as well as migrants. 
20 Crucially, this was evident in the community cohesion discourse that evolved out of the
2001 reports on the Bradford and Oldham riots, which as shown above tended to construe
South  Asian  communities  as self-segregating  and  closed  to  the  values  of  the  wider
national community. In this aspect of the community discourse, there are two types of
communities pitted against each other: the minority community, deemed divisive and
antagonistic to British values, and the majority, national community, which promotes
inclusive values of human rights, tolerance and democracy. In this way, and although this
is  denied by the architects  of  this  discourse34 the 2001 reports  constructed minority
communities of migrant origins as part of the “continuum of threats”. 
21 The essential pathology of the community discourse is that a society based on community
cannot escape the question of the boundary of the community, and that this leads to
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increasing polarisation between the “ins” and the “outs”.35 As Bauman points out, we miss
community  because  we  miss  security.36 The  solution  proposed,  the  creations  of  new
communities  such  as  reconstructed  Britishness  or  the  local  communities  of  the  Big
Society, is flawed, because the criteria for inclusion or exclusion into these communities
create new insecurities for outsiders.
 
Securitised Muslims: the PREVENT programme
22 The attitude of New Labour governments to Muslims certainly was ambivalent. Muslims
clearly became a closely-watched group after the inner city riots of 2001 and of course
even more so, after 9/11 and 7/7. That suspicion was however accompanied by the will to
mediate  with them through representative mainstream councils,  such as  the Muslim
Council of Britain, but also through more radical groups.
23 The reliance on the mediation of Muslim groups also formed the basis of the Preventing
Violent Extremism (PVE) programme, also known as PREVENT (launched in April 2007),
whose key approaches were “promoting shared values, supporting local solutions, building civic
capacity and leadership, and strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders.” By 2008,
the  central  Government  created  two  public  service  agreements  based  on  the
recommendations of the CIC, PSA21 and PSA26. The former was perfectly consistent with
the core ideas behind cohesion, i.e. “to build cohesive, empowered and active communities.”
Three national indicators were to assess the efficiency of PSA21, notably by evaluating
the  relationship  of  different  groups  living  in  a  given community  (NI1),  the  sense  of
belonging  of  people  living  in  a  local  community  (NI2)  and  residents’  perception  of
whether they can influence decisions in their locality (NI3).
24 As for the objective of PSA26, it was to reduce risks related to international terrorism in
the UK and in UK overseas interests, three national indicators measuring the efficiency of
the Public Service Agreement:
• NI35-building resilience to violent extremism
• NI36-protection against terrorist attack (crowded places)
• NI37- public awareness of civil contingency measures
25 Muslims  advocating  non-participation  in  UK  elections,  calling  for  the  creation  of  a
caliphate, promoting Sharia or rejecting homosexuality would be considered “extremist”.
Muslim community organisations willing to co-operate, on the other hand, would receive
subsidies. Many Muslim groups, notably in the North, refused to co-operate, and many of
those that did co-operate did it undercover. Another major bone of contention stemmed
from the fact that the impact of British foreign policy options in Iraq and Afghanistan on
the  radicalisation  of  certain  British  Muslims  was  ignored  by  the  programme.  Given
widespread opposition to PVE,  both within and without  the “Muslim community”,  the
scheme was reviewed by  the  Coalition in  2011 but  both its  name and concept  were
actually upheld. 
26 PREVENT is therefore a key area of immigrant integration policy, in which the tensions
and  contradictions  of  government  approaches  have  played  out  spectacularly.  The
programme  has  been  subjected  to  an  intense  barrage  of  grassroots  and  academic
criticisms. Their main thrust was that through PREVENT the government had explicitly
constructed Islamic  culture  and religion as  a  major  security  threat,  building on and
amplifying a climate of prejudice against Muslims. This debate created a context in which
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successive  governments,  but  particularly  the  Conservative-Liberal  Democrat  coalition
after  2010,  sought  to  re-evaluate  and  reformulate  the  programme  to  make  it  less
inflammatory. This suggests that mobilisation by both Muslim and non-Muslim critics of
the programme have resulted in its partial desecuritisation.
27 Actors of the public debate engaged in the criticism of PREVENT are varied and represent
a broad cross-section of the British intellectual and professional world concerned with
anti-Muslim  discrimination,  inter-cultural  relations  in  policy-making,  policing,  and
foreign policy, as well as grassroots Muslim organisations. Some of the local authorities
required to implement the policy also disapproved of it to the extent that they refused to
do so or did it under different names.37 In one of the first sources of funding available as
part  of  PREVENT,  some local  Muslim community organisations who could have been
expected to apply decided to boycott the programme (although they later changed their
mind).38 Even though they represent a wide array of political standpoints, these criticisms
and initial refusals to participate in PREVENT are strikingly convergent around a few
central points. 
28 As noted earlier, the programme was first mooted in the early part of the 2000s, at a time
when the new language of community cohesion was omnipresent in government thinking
on ethnic  minorities,  and  its  initial  ambition  was  to  apply  the  community  cohesion
approach to the prevention of terrorism. However, this is a contradiction in terms, as
Charles Husband and Yunis Alam have shown.39 Attempts to use a concept designed to
promote inter-cultural or inter-religious dialogue and encourage interactions between
people  of  different  backgrounds  became  problematic  when  it  appeared  that  such
attempts were essentially directed at just one community, namely Muslims. In 2008, the
funding for most of the programme was allocated authoritatively by central government
to local authorities on the basis of the percentage of Muslims in their total population.
The correlation between the amount of funding and Muslims was tight and showed that
this was by far the predominant factor in the allocation of funds.40 This is all the more
problematic as the focalisation on Muslims springs from a cultural and religious reading
of the determinants of extremism which seems to proceed from culturalist prejudices
against that particular religious minority. Many attacks against PREVENT have related it
to the wider context of anti-Muslim prejudice that pervaded public discourse on Islam
and Muslims in the post-9/11 context, which PREVENT has built on and reinforced. In so
doing,  the  programme  has  triggered  a  series  of  negative  feedback  effects.  Muslim
community  organisers  or  activists  refuse  the  funds  for  fear  of  participating  in  a
stigmatising  system  and  losing  credibility  and  respect  within  their  community.41
PREVENT  has  also  been  accused  of  using  social  work  and  local  partnerships  with
community  projects  and  organisations  to  enhance  police  surveillance  of  these
communities, with the negative, unintended effect of reinforcing the suspicion of local
communities  towards social  workers  or  local  organisers  who are viewed as  potential
police collaborators. Arun Kundnani’s report Spooked!, one of the first full-fledged works
on  PREVENT,  insisted  on  that  particular  point.  The  contradiction  in  terms  between
cohesion and anti-terrorism is again apparent here, because the trust between the social
worker  and the  community,  which forms the  basis  of  social  work,  is  eroded by  the
suspicion among the community that he or she is in fact participating in the collection of
sensitive information for the police.42 The focalisation on Muslims also has lent credence
to  the  suspicion  among  other  communities  that  Muslims  end  up  being  somehow
privileged as recipients of public funds. This is particularly problematic in the context of
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the “white backlash”43 and the politics of resentment of the white working-class in the face
of perceived preferential treatment of minorities by the British state.44 In its extreme
form,  this  line  of  reasoning  produces  the  resentful  belief  that  it  is  useful  to  be  a
problematic,  dangerous  community  in  order  to  attract  public  support.45 The broader
assumptions that inform PREVENT have also come under heavy criticism. Behind the
focalisation on Muslims lies the idea in particular that cultural/religious alienation is a
key  factor  in  leading  would-be  terrorists  down  a  pathway  of  radicalisation.  This
culturalist or theological approach to radicalisation makes light of its political dimension,
assuming Islamic terrorism to be largely driven by purely religious motivations. Yet much
evidence in the UK suggests that there is considerable anger directed at British foreign
policy  (invasion  of  Iraq,  conflicts  in  the  Middle-East)  among  Muslims  and  that  this
constitutes a favourable context for the violent radicalisation of some individuals. The
refusal to address this point, which has been a mainstay of British government policy, has
weakened the relevance of PREVENT and has only served to further reinforce the sense of
estrangement  of disaffected  Muslims  from  the  democratic  process.46 Finally,
radicalisation is  a rather loose concept that obscures the variety of  factors that may
contribute to driving an individual to violence, and the complexity of the process that
leads  to  terrorism.  It  obscures  the  fact  that  these  processes  are  largely  individual  –
explaining  why some members  of  one  given Islamic  network  may gravitate  towards
violence, while others will not.47 This is related to the fact that radicalisation is used to
designate the trajectory towards both “extremism” and “violent extremism”. The distinction
between the two justified the allocation of PREVENT funds to organisations viewed as
“extreme” but that do not advocate violence. The dialogue between mainstream society
and these organisations that PREVENT sought to organise was meant to bring them into
the fold of mainstream society, thereby undercutting and isolating violent Islamism. But
this has exposed PREVENT to accusations of religious engineering, with the British state
attempting  to  create  authoritatively  its  own  acceptable  version  of  Islam  instead  of
engaging in a political dialogue over issues such as foreign policy.
 
Towards a partial desecuritisation of Muslims?
29 When the  coalition  government  was  formed in  2010,  it  was  determined to  continue
PREVENT but was also keen to differentiate itself from its Labour predecessor. The first
indications  of  the  government’s  intentions  on  PREVENT  came  in  David  Cameron’s
February  2011  speech  at  the  Munich  security  conference.  This  speech  was  an
unambiguous  attack  on  multiculturalism  and  was  once  again  couched  in  terms
reminiscent of New Labour’s denunciations of segregation, ghettoisation and refusal of
Western values supposedly encouraged by multiculturalist  ideology and policies.  This
time,  however,  the  denunciation  was  more  radical,  and  New  Labour’s  policies  of
partnerships with a wide array of Muslim groups was deemed excessive. The distinction
between violent and non-violent extremism was likewise rejected, and groups which did
not advocate violence, but whose ideology was antagonistic to “British values”, were now
to be excluded from PREVENT. 
30 Arguably, this represents a greater “securitisation” of Muslim groups, which then became 
viewed with greater  suspicion.  The government  was  widely  criticised for  wasting an
opportunity to improve the programme by taking into account  the liberal  criticisms
outlined above. The decision to exclude from the programme some Islamist and Salafist
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groups, such as the STREET project in Brixton that had previously been used as a means
of reaching disaffected Muslim youths exposed to violent Islamist ideology, was viewed
by some practitioners of Prevent as particularly counter-productive and as a direct result
of  neo-conservative  bias.48 Others  pointed  out  its  contradictory  and  unclear  logic. 49
However,  some aspects  of  the New Prevent  strategy that  was  unveiled later  in  2011
displayed a willingness to hear at least some of the earlier criticisms outlined above.50 As
noted by O’Toole et al., two points stand out. The first one was the proposal to distance
the prevention of terrorism from the community cohesion agenda, and, more broadly,
from the issue of immigrant integration. As a result the New PREVENT was less directly
associated, at least in its official framing, with Muslim communities as a whole. The funds
were now targeted to areas defined not essentially in terms of the size of their Muslim
populations,  but  according  to  more  precise  information  on  the  potential  for  violent
extremism.
31 In  relation to  this,  there  was  also  a  new willingness  to  counter  extremism as  such,
including  from  far  right  groups  which  have  also  emerged  as a  possible  vector  of
radicalisation in British society.  Interestingly,  one of  the most visible such groups in
British media and politics is the English Defence League (EDL), which has defined itself
largely as an anti-Muslim organisation determined to combat the “islamisation” of the
United Kingdom. In 2011, David Cameron’s Munich Speech was deemed insensitive by
vast swathes of the Liberal Democrats, including by the then Deputy Prime Minister Nick
Clegg, as the speech, which mostly dealt with the question of Islamism, was delivered
simultaneously with an EDL march in Luton.51 
32 As pointed out by O’Toole et al., the motivations for these changes were not just to accept
the arguments of a mostly left-of-centre milieu of academics, social workers and local
community  leaders  and activists,  but  also  and perhaps  most  importantly  to  suit  the
Conservatives’ programme of budget cuts and traditional hostility to social work.52 In
particular, the idea of “community cohesion”, so dear to New Labour governments, was
dropped. It is also this context that may explain the new dissociation between counter-
terrorism and social work. Yet the lively policy debate around PREVENT in the UK has led
to at least a partial attempt to tone down some of its most controversial aspects. 
 
Conclusion
33 In the United Kingdom, the changing policy discourse on immigrant integration has been
driven  by  a  securitised  vision  of  populations  of  immigrant  origin,  which  has  bred
changing forms of ethnicisation. This paper has illustrated this trend in relation both to
the development of the “community cohesion” and “shared values” guidelines that followed
the urban riots of 2001 and to PREVENT, the counter-terrorism programme put in place
after 7/7. While the older equal opportunities and multiculturalist agenda was still given
a nod in the post-riot reports of 2001, it was now deemed to have encouraged segregation
or indeed “self-segregation”. The ethnic leadership in particular (mainly Muslim leaders in
cities like Bradford) were accused of using the support of local authorities to impose
traditional,  illiberal values within their communities. Community cohesion became an
omnipresent guideline in a wide array of policies, from education to housing, youth work,
social  care,  and  all  types  of  community  partnerships.  Essentially,  this  meant  a  new
emphasis on a “common vision” for all communities and the “strong and positive relationships
” between “people from different backgrounds”. It implied the rejection of ethnic minority
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cultures as potentially separatist and self-segregating, unable or unwilling to share the
values of the majority. After 7/7, the mood hardened towards Muslims, with Blair and his
key ministers delivering a series of speeches enjoining Muslims to embrace British values
and to accept their “duty to integrate”, as one of the then Prime Minister’s speeches was
entitled.  In that context,  the main goal  of  the PREVENT programme, inspired by the
community cohesion agenda, was to channel funding towards local communities which
may harbour potential  terrorists in order to promote community cohesion, challenge
extremist  ideas  and prevent  the  “radicalisation”  of  individuals.  The programme came
under heavy criticism from diverse sections of the academic world and from the targeted
communities themselves. Despite its avowed objective of promoting community cohesion,
it  was  widely  criticised  for  stigmatising  at  the  outset  Muslim  communities  by
authoritatively allocating funds to local  authorities on the basis of  the percentage of
Muslims in their total population. It was derided for mixing uneasily social work and
police work and was suspected of facilitating the surveillance of communities under the
cover of innocuous activities for young people or women. Its intellectual premises – that
there was a process (or “pathway”) of radicalisation, and that cultural or religious factors
were  crucial  in  this  process  –  were  also  criticised  for  reflecting  prejudices  against
Muslims, and for ignoring other, obvious factors of anger and extremism among Muslim
communities, such as British foreign policy. In both the community cohesion discourse
after the 2001 riots, and in the PREVENT programme after the London bombings, a stated
will to engage in dialogue with ethnic minority communities on the basis of common
values resulted in the paradoxical reinforcement of ethnic stereotypes. This is because in
both cases the ideological building block of the new policies has been the notion of “
community”– explicitly in the case of “community cohesion”, and through the construction
of radical Islamism (however defined) as a central factor in the radicalisation process. The
omnipresence of the paradigm of community, culture or religion in British approaches to
diversity  suggests  at  least  some  level  of continuity  with  the  previously  dominant
multiculturalist  approach.  In  the  British  context,  the  extension  of  the  “continuum  of
threats”  to  populations  of  migrant  origins  has  resulted  in  a  situation  in  which  the
attempts to recognise diversity as a positive value, or to redress disadvantages linked to
origins or language, that originally motivated the multiculturalist project, have been de-
emphasised.  Only the essentialising and exclusionary dimension of  ethnicised policy-
making remains. 
34 A silver lining may have been discernible, however, in the coalition’s attempts to take
into account the chorus of criticisms that has rained down on PREVENT. In its revised
version of 2011, PREVENT was aimed at extremism in general and moved away from the
confusion between social work and counter-terrorism. Likewise,  it  is noteworthy that
certain religious or cultural demands accommodated in the later part of the Blair/Brown
years, notably in state schools (e.g. single-sex prayer rooms for Muslims in certain state
schools)  have not  been questioned ever since.  Whether this  can ultimately lead to a
complete change of policy that would finally stop associating the terrorist threat with
Muslim  populations  remains  to  be  assessed  in  the  longer  term,  although  recent
developments and their consequences, notably in France and Belgium, indicate that it is
still far from being the case.
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ABSTRACTS
Since 2001, successive British governments have rolled back the multiculturalist policies of the
previous decades, at least in theory, at the level of policy discourse. In the context of the 9/11
terror attacks, followed by the London bombings of 7 July 2005, and of the riots of the north of
England of 2001, the discourse on the incorporation of migrants and minorities, both from the
government  and the  media,  has  become securitised.  Multiculturalism has  been criticised  for
encouraging  ethnic  communities  to  foster  illiberal  values,  leading  to  segregation,  and  for
encouraging  separatism  or  even  violent  extremism  among  some  individuals.  New  policy
discourses  have  emphasised  common  values,  a  reconstructed  British  national  identity,  and
intercultural dialogue. Yet within this universalistic turn it is possible to discern the persistence
of an understanding of migrant incorporation, which is still framed in terms of cultural or ethnic
community. This can be observed in the concepts of “community cohesion” or “Britishness”, which
more  or  less  explicitly  require  migrants  and  minorities  to  accept  dominant  values,  thereby
implicitly  ethnicising  them.  The  same  logic  is  at  work  in  the  assumptions  underlying  the
PREVENT programme, which aims at preventing violent extremism in Muslim communities. 
Depuis le 11 septembre 2001,  les gouvernements britanniques sont revenus sur les politiques
multiculturalistes des décennies précédentes, au niveau du discours politique, du moins. Dans un
contexte  marqué  par  des  attentats  aux  Etats-Unis  puis  à  Londres,  ainsi  que  par  les  graves
émeutes du nord de l’Angleterre en 2001, on a assisté à ce que l’on peut appeler la « sécuritisation
 » des discours sur l’intégration des migrants et des minorités. Le multiculturalisme a été critiqué
pour avoir concouru à l’expression de valeurs incompatibles avec la démocratie et le respect des
droits de l’Homme, et, in fine, d’avoir mené à la ségrégation, au séparatisme, voire à l’extrémisme
violent chez certains individus. De nouvelles approches de politique publique ont mis l’accent sur
les  valeurs  communes,  une  identité  nationale  reconstruite  et  le  dialogue  interculturel.
Cependant,  il  est  possible  de  discerner  dans  ce  tournant  universaliste  la  persistance  d’une
approche  de  l’incorporation  des  migrants  se  fondant  sur  les  communautés  ethniques  ou
culturelles. C’est le cas dans les discours sur la « britannicité » (Britishness) ou sur la community
cohesion,  qui  demandent  aux  migrants  et  minorités  d’accepter  les  valeurs  communes,  les
ethnicisant  ainsi  plus  ou  moins  explicitement.  C’est  aussi  le  cas  dans  les  présupposés  du
programme  PREVENT, qui  vise  à  prévenir  l’extrémisme  violent  au  sein  des  communautés
musulmanes. 
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